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THE “PERIPHERAL PLAINTIFF”:  DUTY 
DETERMINATIONS IN TAKE-HOME ASBESTOS 
CASES 
Yelena Kotlarsky* 
 
Since the 1970s, litigation concerning the dangers of asbestos in the 
workplace has transformed from a few workers’ compensation claims to 
hundreds of thousands of lawsuits against companies in nearly every 
industry.  While the typical plaintiff in these claims is an employee injured 
while handling asbestos at the worksite, a new class of “peripheral 
plaintiffs” has recently emerged.  These plaintiffs consist of family members 
who are exposed to asbestos after inhaling the dust that saturates an 
employee’s person and clothing.  The family members then bring claims 
against the employers and the owners of the premises claiming that they 
were negligent in allowing the workers to carry asbestos home when the 
danger of asbestos was well known. 
The highest courts of six states stand divided on whether an employer or 
premises owner owes a duty to these third-party plaintiffs to protect them 
from asbestos-related harm.  Two states have relied heavily on the 
foreseeability of the harm to hold that landowners and employers do owe a 
duty to third-party plaintiffs. On the other hand, four states have focused on 
a range of factors, like the lack of a relationship between the parties and 
the need to constrain asbestos litigation, to hold that landowners and 
employers do not owe a duty to third-party plaintiffs. 
This Note examines the interstate conflict and concludes that all six 
courts have engaged in an unclear and unnecessarily fact-specific analysis 
of duty.  It argues that the Third Restatement’s method of determining duty 
represents a clearer approach, because it sends factual questions to the 
jury and encourages courts to take “no duty” decisions more seriously. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the course of Anthony Olivo’s thirty-seven-year career as a pipe 
welder, he routinely came into contact with asbestos in materials like pipe 
covering and gaskets.1  At the end of every work day, Mr. Olivo came 
home, took off his clothing, and left it next to the washing machine located 
in the basement of the home that he shared with his wife Eleanor.2  Every 
evening, Mrs. Olivo would wash these clothes so that her husband could 
 
 1. Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 895 A.2d 1143, 1146 (N.J. 2006). 
 2. Id. 
2012] THE “PERIPHERAL PLAINTIFF” 453 
wear them the next day.3  Sixteen years after Mr. Olivo retired, doctors 
diagnosed Mrs. Olivo with mesothelioma,4 and she died shortly afterward.5  
Mr. Olivo then brought a wrongful death action against, among other 
defendants, the owners of the premises on which he worked.6 
These types of “take-home” asbestos cases are coming on the heels of 
hundreds of thousands of claims and decades of litigation about the dangers 
of asbestos exposure.7  Asbestos was once lauded for its fire-resistant 
properties,8 but became heavily regulated when researchers discovered that 
inhalation of its fibers could lead to a wide range of respiratory diseases, 
including cancer.9 
Backed by epidemiological studies and supported by strict regulations of 
asbestos in the workplace promulgated by the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA), many employees who had been exposed to 
asbestos at their workplace felt empowered to bring claims.10  By 1997, 
these employees began suing everyone from asbestos manufacturers to 
more “peripheral defendants,”11 like premises owners and third-party 
product manufacturers, in what the Supreme Court called an “asbestos-
litigation crisis.”12 
More recently, asbestos litigation has seen the growth of not only the 
“peripheral defendant,” but also the “peripheral plaintiff.”13  These 
plaintiffs consist of family members who become exposed to asbestos from 
inhaling asbestos dust on an employee’s person or work clothes, and who 
bring claims against employers and premises owners for negligence.14  
State courts stand divided on whether employers and premises owners owe 
 
 3. Id. 
 4. “Mesothelioma” is a cancer that affects the lining of the chest or abdomen. See Fact 
Sheet:  Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, NAT’L CANCER INST., http://www.cancer.gov/
cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/asbestos (last visited Sept. 21, 2012); see also infra notes 118–20 
and accompanying text. 
 5. Olivo, 895 A.2d at 1146. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, ASBESTOS 
LITIGATION COST AND COMPENSATION:  AN INTERIM REPORT vi (2002), available 
at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/documented_briefings/2005/DB397.pdf; see 
also infra notes 154–58 and accompanying text. 
 8. See John E. Craighead et al., Mineralogy of Asbestos, in ASBESTOS AND ITS DISEASES 
23, 23 (John E. Craighead & Allen R. Gibbs eds., 2008); see also infra notes 95–100 and 
accompanying text. 
 9. See generally John E. Craighead, Diseases Associated with Asbestos Industrial 
Products and Environmental Exposure, in ASBESTOS AND ITS DISEASES, supra note 8, at 39, 
39 (detailing the different diseases suffered by workers who handled asbestos in various 
industries); see also infra notes 117–29 and accompanying text. 
 10. See Deborah R. Hensler, Asbestos Litigation in the United States:  Triumph and 
Failure of the Civil Justice System, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 255, 259 (2006); see also infra notes 
106–09, 145 and accompanying text. 
 11. See Mark A. Behrens & Frank Cruz-Alvarez, A Potential New Frontier in Asbestos 
Litigation:  Premises Owner Liability for “Take Home” Exposure Claims, MEALEY’S LITIG. 
REP.:  ASBESTOS, July 5, 2006, at 1; see also infra notes 159–70 and accompanying text. 
 12. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997). 
 13. See Behrens & Cruz-Alvarez, supra note 11, at 1; see also infra Part II.C. 
 14. See Mark A. Behrens, What’s New in Asbestos Litigation?, 28 REV. LITIG. 501, 545–
49 (2009); see also infra notes 179–86 and accompanying text. 
454 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
a duty to take-home asbestos plaintiffs to protect them from asbestos-
related diseases.15 
This Note addresses the state conflict regarding whether employees and 
premises owners owe a duty to these “peripheral plaintiffs.”  Part I begins 
by giving an overview of the negligence cause of action and then examines 
different approaches courts have taken when deciding duty.  Part II details 
the history of asbestos and the exponential growth of asbestos litigation.  
Part III discusses the conflict among six state courts regarding whether 
employers and premises owners owe a duty of reasonable care toward take-
home asbestos plaintiffs.  Finally, Part IV argues that all six courts 
employed the wrong standard they determined duty, and advocates the 
method proposed by the Restatement (Third) of Torts. 
I.  THEORIES OF LIABILITY FOR ASBESTOS EXPOSURE 
When a court faces an asbestos personal injury claim, it must decide 
whether the defendant—either an employer, premise owner, or 
manufacturer—negligently exposed the plaintiff to harm from asbestos-
containing products or was strictly liable for producing those products.16  
Part I.A describes the basic elements of negligence:  duty, breach, 
causation, and injury.  Part I.B explains the element of duty in greater 
detail, examining the factors that courts have used in their determinations of 
duty.  Finally, Part I.C looks at the cause of action for strict liability. 
A.  The Basics of Negligence 
Plaintiffs who suffer an injury as a result of asbestos exposure need to 
prove that the defendant was negligent—meaning that the defendant failed 
to exercise reasonable care toward them.17  Accordingly, plaintiffs must 
satisfy the four prima facie elements of negligence:  duty, breach, causation, 
and injury.18  The plaintiff must prove that the defendant owed a duty of 
 
 15. Compare Price v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 26 A.3d 162 (Del. 2011) (holding 
that employers do not owe a duty to take-home asbestos plaintiffs), CSX Transp., Inc. v. 
Williams, 608 S.E.2d 208 (Ga. 2005) (holding that employers do not owe a duty to take-
home asbestos plaintiffs), In re Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist. Ct. App. of Tex., 
740 N.W.2d 206 (Mich. 2007) (holding that premises owners do not owe a duty to take-
home asbestos plaintiffs), and In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115 (N.Y. 2005) 
(holding that premises owners do not owe a duty to take-home asbestos plaintiffs), with 
Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 895 A.2d 1143 (N.J. 2006) (holding that premises owners owe 
a duty to take-home asbestos plaintiffs), and Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 
S.W.3d 347 (Tenn. 2008) (holding that employers owe a duty to take-home asbestos 
plaintiffs). 
 16. See Price, 26 A.3d at 166–67 (discussing the standard for negligence); Braaten v. 
Saberhagen Holdings, 198 P.3d 493, 497–500 (Wash. 2008) (discussing the standard for 
strict products liability). 
 17. E.g., Price, 26 A.3d at 166–67; Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 355. 
 18. See JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS 
TO U.S. LAW:  TORTS 72 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2010).  One potentially confusing aspect of 
negligence is that the term carries two meanings:  negligent behavior and negligence as a 
cause of action.  Thus, while a person’s behavior could be negligent, this does not mean that 
he is liable for the tort of negligence, because he may not have a duty to the person harmed 
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care to a person like the plaintiff, that the defendant breached that duty, and 
that this breach caused the plaintiff’s harm.19 
1.  Duty 
“Duty” in negligence cases examines the standard of reasonable conduct 
that defendants must engage in to avoid harming others.20  Duty is 
essentially an obligation to observe a particular course of action in relation 
to others.21  For example, drivers owe a duty to other people who use the 
roads:  to not cause them physical harm.22  Courts will often consider 
whether the defendant should have foreseen that his conduct would cause 
harm to the plaintiff.23  In addition to considering whether the defendant 
could foresee causing harm to the plaintiff, courts recognize a duty based on 
a “special relationship” between the defendant and the plaintiff.24  Whether 
a defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff is a question of law determined by a 
judge.25  This Note will discuss duty in greater detail in Part I.B below. 
2.  Breach 
If a judge determines that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, the 
jury then decides whether the defendant breached that duty.26  A defendant 
breaches his duty if he fails to conform to the reasonable standard of care 
under the circumstances.27  Breach exists as a separate element from duty, 
and a plaintiff must independently satisfy breach to allow a negligence 
claim to go forward.28 
 
or his negligent behavior may not have been a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. See 
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 114, at 269 (2000). 
 19. See GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18, at 72; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 281 (1965). 
 20. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 324 (4th ed. 
1971); see also GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18, at 77–78. 
 21. See PROSSER, supra note 20, § 53, at 324. 
 22. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18, at 77; see also PROSSER, supra note 20, § 53, 
at 324 (noting that a driver has a duty to an approaching car to “moderate his speed, to keep 
a proper lookout, or to blow his horn”). 
 23. See GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18, at 78; see also infra notes 59–62 and 
accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of foreseeability in duty determinations). 
 24. See GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18, at 82; see also infra notes 52–54 and 
accompanying text. 
 25. See GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18, at 77; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 (2005). 
 26. See PROSSER, supra note 20, § 37, at 207.  Judges can sometimes decide breach as a 
matter of law but only when no reasonable jury would determine otherwise. Id.; see also 
Mair v. C & O R.R., 851 F.2d 829, 832 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that the lower court erred in 
sending the question of breach to the jury when no reasonable juror would find that the 
defendant breached its duty of care to the plaintiff). 
 27. See PROSSER, supra note 20, § 30, at 143; DOBBS, supra note 18, § 114, at 270. 
 28. See W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability:  The New Vision of Duty and 
Judicial Power in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739, 744 
(2005) (noting that if a defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, but did not breach that duty, 
no negligence will be found. Additionally, if the defendant acted unreasonably, but had no 
duty to the plaintiff, then the defendant also would not be negligent). 
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Juries take into account a myriad of factors when they determine 
breach.29  In considering the reasonable standard of care under the 
circumstances, foreseeability often plays a large role.30  A defendant did not 
breach his duty of care if a reasonable person31 could not have foreseen the 
harm or could not have reasonably avoided it.32  Juries can also consider 
whether the usefulness of a defendant’s conduct outweighs the risks it 
creates for others;33 in other words, juries weigh the costs and benefits of a 
particular course of action.  If the probability and extent of the harm 
outweigh the utility of the risk-creating conduct, then a defendant has acted 
unreasonably and breached his duty of care.34 
3.  Causation 
A plaintiff cannot prove his case for negligence without demonstrating 
that the defendant’s conduct caused the plaintiff’s harm.35  A plaintiff needs 
to establish both factual causation and proximate causation.36  A 
defendant’s conduct is a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s harm if it was a 
“substantial factor” in bringing about that harm.37  However, the 
defendant’s actions are not a cause-in-fact if the plaintiff would have 
suffered the harm regardless of the defendant’s actions.38 
After the jury establishes that the defendant’s conduct caused the 
plaintiff’s harm, it must still determine whether the defendant should be 
 
 29. See PROSSER, supra note 20, § 31, at 146–49; see also GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra 
note 18, at 87–88 (noting that juries will apply a different standard of care to, for example, a 
physician and a child). 
 30. See DOBBS, supra note 18, § 143, at 334; see also PROSSER, supra note 20, § 43, at 
250 (noting that an individual is not expected to take precautions against harms that he 
cannot foresee). 
 31. See PROSSER, supra note 20, § 32, at 150 (explaining that the reasonable person is 
“[a] model of all proper qualities, with only those human shortcomings and weaknesses 
which the community will tolerate on the occasion”). 
 32. See DOBBS, supra note 18, § 143, at 334; Cardi, supra note 28, at 745. 
 33. See DOBBS, supra note 18, § 144, at 337; PROSSER, supra note 20, § 32, at 148 
(“Against [the] probability, and gravity, of the risk, must be balanced in every case the utility 
of the type of conduct in question.”). 
 34. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).  Judge 
Learned Hand proposed this analysis when he articulated that the burden of precaution must 
be less than the probability multiplied by the damages (B < PL). Id.  Judges do not typically 
instruct juries on the Hand formula, which is used mostly by judges in determining motions 
for a directed verdict or summary judgment.  Instead, juries are instructed on probability and 
on commensurate care, both of which are important for a cost/benefit analysis.  Moreover, 
oftentimes lawyers will make cost/benefit arguments before the jury in court. DOBBS, supra 
note 18, § 145, at 342 n.6. 
 35. See PROSSER, supra note 20, § 30, at 143; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 281(c) (1965). 
 36. See GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra  note 18, at 94; see also PROSSER, supra note 20, 
§ 42, at 244. 
 37. See PROSSER, supra note 20, § 41, at 240; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 431. 
 38. See GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18, at 95 (noting that if the plaintiff “would 
have suffered the injury anyway, even if the defendant had not been careless,” no cause-in-
fact exists). 
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held responsible for that harm.39  The consequences of a person’s 
unreasonable conduct are potentially limitless, and if the law held him 
accountable for all of these consequences he would be subjected to 
boundless liability.40  Thus, to constrain liability, courts have decided to 
deny liability when “the harm that resulted from the defendant’s negligence 
is so clearly outside the risks he created that it would be unjust or at least 
impractical to impose liability.”41  Proximate cause represents the scope of 
the defendant’s liability, and asks whether the defendant should have 
foreseen the type of harm that befell the plaintiff.42  Even if the defendant 
breached his duty of care by acting unreasonably and caused the plaintiff’s 
injury, he can avoid liability if the consequences of his conduct were too 
remote or too unusual.43  Just as the jury determines breach, the jury 
considers the question of proximate cause as well.44 
4.  Injury 
A negligence claim cannot survive if the plaintiff has not suffered an 
injury.45  Unlike criminal law, tort law does not impose liability for careless 
conduct if it has not harmed another individual.46  The different harms that 
tort law recognizes as “injuries” include “physical harms, property 
destruction, emotional distress, and economic loss.”47 
 B.  The Details of Duty 
As this Note will discuss in Part III below, courts that face take-home 
asbestos cases stand divided on whether an employer or premises owner 
owes a duty to third-party plaintiffs to protect them from harm.48  Even if a 
 
 39. See PROSSER, supra note 20, § 41, at 244; see also GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra 
note 18, at 103–09. 
 40. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 
264 (5th ed. 1984); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430. 
 41. See DOBBS, supra note 18, § 180, at 443. 
 42. See Cardi, supra note 28, at 748–49; see also GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18, 
at 106–07. 
 43. See Cardi, supra note 28, at 749.  A good example of this is Allison v. City of 
Fredericksburg, 71 S.E. 525 (Va. 1911), in which the court held that it was unforeseeable 
that after bruising her leg by stepping into a hole on a plank bridge, the plaintiff would 
develop cancer that would necessitate amputation of the leg. Id. at 527. The defendant 
breached its duty of care by not maintaining the bridge, but the consequences were so remote 
that no proximate causation existed. Id. at 527. 
 44. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 40, § 45, at 321; see also PROSSER, supra note 20, 
§ 41, at 240.  A judge should only determine proximate cause as a matter of law if “the issue 
is so clear that reasonable men could not differ.” Id. 
 45. See PROSSER, supra note 20, § 30, at 143–44; see also GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra  
note 18, at 72. 
 46. See PROSSER, supra note 20, § 30, at 143–44 (“Negligent conduct in itself is not such 
an interference with the interests of the world at large that there is any right to complain of it 
. . . except in the case of some individual whose interests have suffered.”). 
 47. See GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18, at 135.  Courts will also sometimes 
recognize an increased chance of developing an illness, or a decreased chance of survival as 
a result of the defendant’s conduct, as an injury as well. Id. 
 48. See infra Part III. 
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defendant has acted unreasonably and caused harm to the plaintiff, a court 
can only hold the defendant liable for his actions if he owed a duty to the 
plaintiff.49  Duty represents the only element of negligence that is a 
question of law for a judge to decide, and without this element a court 
cannot find negligence.50 
Courts can consider a variety of different factors when determining 
whether a defendant owes a duty of reasonable care to a plaintiff.51  These 
factors include the “foreseeability of harm to [the plaintiff], the degree of 
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection 
between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame 
attached to the defendant’s conduct, and the policy of preventing future 
harm.”52  Some factors weigh more heavily than others in certain contexts.  
For example, when the Fifth Circuit decided whether manufacturers of 
asbestos owed a duty to warn users of the product’s hazards, it held that 
even when the utility of the product is high enough to justify putting it on 
the market, its dangerous nature compels a duty to warn.53 
Another important factor that weighs heavily in courts’ determinations of 
duty is the presence—or absence—of a “special relationship” between the 
parties.54  Examples of “special relationships” include doctor-patient, 
school-student, hotel-guest, and airline-passenger.55  In these situations, the 
law has recognized that because of the nature of the relationship between 
the parties, a duty should be imposed on the defendant to take reasonable 
care to avoid harm to the plaintiff.56 
One of the traditional distinctions that courts draw when determining 
whether a duty exists is whether the defendant’s actions in relation to the 
plaintiff constituted misfeasance—an affirmative act—or nonfeasance—a 
 
 49. See PROSSER, supra note 20, § 56, at 340–43 (noting that a court will typically not 
find an individual liable for failing to come to a person’s aid, because one ordinarily does not 
have a duty to protect another from harm). 
 50. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 7 (2005); GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18, at 77. 
 51. See Cardi, supra note 28, at 751–55; see also PROSSER, supra note 20, § 53, at 325–
26 (“‘[D]uty’ is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those 
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to 
protection.”). 
 52. Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958). 
 53. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th Cir. 1973) 
(“The rationale for this rule is that the user or consumer is entitled to make his own choice as 
to whether the product’s utility or benefits justify exposing himself to the risk of harm.”). 
 54. See  GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18, at 82; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 314A cmt. b (1965) (noting that a duty arising from a special relationship 
represents an exception to the general rule that a person does not have a duty to protect 
others from harm). 
 55. See GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18, at 82. 
 56. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of Macpherson, 146 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1733, 1832–44 (1998) (“The relationship between defendant and plaintiff 
actually can be used to explain why we expect defendants to take precautions against certain 
kinds of harm to a plaintiff . . . .”). 
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failure to act.57  Courts are more reluctant to find that a duty exists when the 
defendant has not engaged in an affirmative action that harmed the plaintiff, 
but has simply failed to act to prevent the plaintiff from harm.58  The reason 
for this could be that “by ‘misfeasance’ the defendant has created a new risk 
of harm to the plaintiff, while by ‘nonfeasance’ he has at least made his 
situation no worse.”59  A court will generally only recognize a duty if it 
determines that the defendant’s actions constituted a failure to warn the 
plaintiff of a risk when a “special relationship” existed between the 
parties.60 
Foreseeability also represents a pervasive element in courts’ 
determinations of duty.61  In most states, courts will determine whether the 
defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff by asking whether the risk, 
the injury, or the person injured were reasonably foreseeable.62  In the 
context of asbestos litigation, plaintiffs’ attorneys often present evidence 
that the defendants knew asbestos was dangerous and should have foreseen 
that contact with asbestos could lead to an increased chance of illness.63  As 
a result, plaintiffs’ attorneys argue that defendants have a duty to protect the 
plaintiffs from exposure or, at the least, to warn them of the harm associated 
with handling asbestos.64 
Some scholars, as well as the Third Restatement, have criticized the 
pervasiveness of foreseeability in courts’ duty analyses.65  They state that 
 
 57. See PROSSER, supra note 20, § 56, at 338–39 (“In the determination of the existence 
of a duty, there runs through much of the law a distinction between action and inaction.”); 
see also GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18, at 118–19. 
 58. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (“The fact that the actor realizes or 
should realize that action on his part is necessary for another’s aid or protection does not of 
itself impose upon him a duty to take such action.”). 
 59. PROSSER, supra note 20, § 56, at 339.  Courts will typically not impose a duty on an 
individual to rescue another person from a harm he has not created.  For example, an “expert 
swimmer, with a boat and a rope at hand, who sees another drowning before his eyes, is not 
required to do anything at all about it, but may sit on the dock, smoke his cigarette, and 
watch the man drown.” Id. at 340. 
 60. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A; see also supra notes 54–56 and 
accompanying text. 
 61. See Cardi, supra note 28, at 740; see also GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18, at 
78 (stating that the “notion of reasonably foreseeable victims . . . is today a standard 
doctrinal test for determining to whom a duty of care is owed”). 
 62. See, e.g., Benjamin C. Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and Proximate 
Cause, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1247, 1258 n.47 (2009) (citing the highest state courts of 
forty-five states for the proposition that foreseeability represents a vital inquiry in their 
determinations of duty). 
 63. See Kevin Leahy, Asbestos Exposure and the Law in the United States, in ASBESTOS 
AND ITS DISEASES, supra note 8, at 346, 358 (“The notion of industry participants working 
together in collusion to prevent a full realization of the known and knowable hazards of 
asbestos . . . became standard fare in all jury trials.”); see also infra Part III. 
 64. E.g., Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 895 A.2d 1143 (N.J. 2006); In re N.Y.C. 
Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115 (N.Y. 2005); Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 
S.W.3d 347 (Tenn. 2008). 
 65. See Patrick J. Kelley, Restating Duty, Breach, and Proximate Cause in Negligence 
Law:  Descriptive Theory and the Rule of Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1039, 1046 (2001) (stating 
that foreseeability is “so open-ended [that it] can be used to explain any decision, even 
decisions directly opposed to each other”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 cmt. j (2005) (stating that courts should 
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courts use foreseeability to engage in fact-specific determinations that 
should be left for the jury to examine when it considers breach and 
proximate cause.66  These scholars conclude that when courts analyze 
foreseeability they overstep their role by deciding questions of fact, because 
whether a defendant could foresee harm to a particular plaintiff or class of 
plaintiffs necessarily involves a factual inquiry.67  These fact-specific 
decisions do not set a clear standard for courts to follow in future cases that 
involve slightly different facts.68  Further, courts will sometimes use 
concepts like foreseeability to disguise the policy decisions that inform their 
opinions,69 because a holding overtly based on policy determinations treads 
too closely on the territory of the legislature.70 
The Third Restatement attempts to solve these perceived inadequacies by 
suggesting a different standard by which courts should determine duty.71  
Section 7(a) states that, “[a]n actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise 
reasonable care when the actor’s conduct creates a risk of physical harm,”72 
thereby establishing a default duty of reasonable care when the defendant’s 
conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injury.73  Thus, under the 
Third Restatement’s approach, courts should not consider fact-specific 
criteria, like foreseeability, because they can presume that a duty exists.74  
This would leave questions of foreseeability to the jury.75 
The Third Restatement, however, does not presuppose duty in every 
circumstance.  Section 7(b) states that, “[i]n exceptional cases, when an 
articulated countervailing principle or policy warrants denying or limiting 
 
leave determinations of foreseeability to the jury); Cardi, supra note 28, at 743 (noting that 
foreseeability has a “schizophrenic existence” in negligence law). 
 66. See Cardi, supra note 28, at 774–78; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 cmt. j. 
 67. See Cardi, supra note 28, at 741 (noting that one of the problems with courts’ use of 
foreseeability in duty is that “it operates as a vehicle by which judges decide questions 
traditionally reserved for the jury”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY 
FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 cmt. j. 
 68. See William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (1953) 
(noting that the case law about reasonable foreseeability is a “rope of sand, and offers neither 
certainty nor convenience”). 
 69. See Cardi, supra note 28, at 763 n.122 (“When judges refuse to recognize a duty in 
the teeth of foreseeable harm to others, they are making an exception, on public policy 
grounds, to the broad duty to avoid conduct threatening foreseeable harm to others.” (citing 
Kelley, supra note 65, at 1045)); see also Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., A Primer on the Patterns 
of Negligence, 53 LA. L. REV. 1509, 1523 (1993) (“[J]udges should not rely on, or hide 
behind, words like:  direct, remote, foreseeable, unforeseeable . . . and whatever other magic 
mumbo jumbo courts could use to obfuscate the policies that were really at the heart of their 
decisions.”). 
 70. See Cardi, supra note 28, at 767 (“[F]oreseeability feels safer than naked, legislative-
like policy decisions.”). 
 71. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 7. 
 72. Id. § 7(a). 
 73. See id. reporter’s note cmt. a. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See id. cmt. j; see also Cardi, supra note 28, at 794 (stating that if courts adopt the 
Third Restatement, then foreseeability will “no longer [be] a presumed matter for the judge, 
but a presumed matter for the jury”). 
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liability in a particular class of cases, a court may decide that the defendant 
has no duty or that the ordinary duty of reasonable care requires 
modification.”76  This encourages courts that find no duty to state their 
policy concern explicitly in order to increase transparency in their decision-
making process.77  The provision does, however, state that courts should 
only reach a finding of no duty based on policy concerns “in exceptional” 
cases.78  Courts can also deny liability by deciding breach and proximate 
cause as a matter of law,79 which forces courts to consider whether no 
reasonable jury would have decided otherwise—a deferential standard.80 
As this Note will discuss in Part III, whether a court focuses on the 
relationship between the parties, the foreseeability of harm, or the 
characterization of the defendants’ actions as nonfeasance often proves 
determinative.81  Unlike employees, take-home asbestos plaintiffs do not 
have a special relationship with either the employers or the premises 
owners.82  Therefore, courts that focus on this aspect of duty often find that 
there is no duty.83  Similarly, if the court characterizes the actions of the 
defendants as nonfeasance because they failed to warn their employees 
instead of actively maintaining an unsafe environment, it will also find that 
no duty existed.84  On the other hand, as this Note will mention in Part II.A 
below, many employers knew about the hazards of asbestos, and after 1972 
OSHA set forth regulations that governed asbestos exposure.85  Courts 
point to these facts when stating that the risk of harm to take-home asbestos 
plaintiffs was foreseeable, and that employers and/or premises owners 
should have taken steps to decrease this risk.86 
C.  The Basics of Strict Liability 
Strict liability describes when an actor faces liability solely as a result of 
causing harm to another individual, without an inquiry into whether he 
 
 76. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 7(b). 
 77. See id. reporter’s note cmt. j (“[A]rticulating the policy or principle at stake will 
contribute to transparency, clarity, and better understanding of tort law.”). 
 78. Id. § 7(b). 
 79. Id. § 7 cmt. i. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See infra Part III.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey and the Tennessee Supreme 
Court focused on foreseeability and found that a duty existed to take-home asbestos 
plaintiffs. See infra Part III.A.  The New York Court of Appeals, the Delaware Supreme 
Court, the Michigan Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court of Georgia, on the other hand, 
used lack of a relationship and nonfeasance to deny that a duty existed. See infra Part III.B. 
 82. See infra Part III.B.1–3 (discussing the opinions of the New York Court of Appeals, 
the Michigan Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court of Georgia, which all stress that the 
defendants owed no duty to third-party nonemployees). 
 83. See infra Part III.B.1–3. 
 84. See infra Part III.B.1, 4 (discussing the opinions of the New York Court of Appeals 
and the Delaware Supreme Court). 
 85. See infra notes 106–09 and accompanying text. 
 86. See infra Part III.A.1–2 (discussing the opinions of the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey and the Tennessee Supreme Court). 
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behaved in a reasonable manner under the circumstances.87  Courts have 
adopted this concept regarding product defects.88  Justice Roger J. Traynor 
of the Supreme Court of California articulated the basis for this theory in 
his concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno89: 
Manufacturing processes, frequently valuable secrets, are ordinarily either 
inaccessible to or beyond the ken of the general public. The consumer no 
longer has means or skill enough to investigate for himself the soundness 
of a product, even when it is not contained in a sealed package, and his 
erstwhile vigilance has been lulled by the steady efforts of manufacturers 
to build up confidence by advertising and marketing devices such as 
trade-marks.90 
Manufacturers stand in the best position to know the dangers of defectively 
produced goods, making it their responsibility to ensure the safety of the 
product when handled by consumers.91  Therefore, to bring a successful 
strict product liability claim, a plaintiff must only prove that he suffered an 
injury caused by the defendant’s dangerously defective product in the 
normal course of using that product.92  As this Note will discuss in Part 
II.B, product liability suits against the manufacturers of asbestos 
experienced enormous success when the hazards of the product became 
well known.93 
II.  HISTORY OF ASBESTOS:  FROM “MAGIC MINERAL” TO “OCCUPATIONAL 
HEALTH DISASTER” 
The magical qualities of asbestos, the mineral that refuses to burn, were 
known as far back as the days of Charlemagne who supposedly amazed his 
guests when he threw a tablecloth made with asbestos into the fire and 
retrieved it unscathed.94  Part II.A of this Note details the history of 
asbestos use and how the mineral’s positive qualities became overshadowed 
by the severe health hazard it creates for anyone who regularly handles it.  
Part II.B recounts the growth of asbestos litigation:  what started as a 
relatively small number of workers’ compensation claims soon ballooned to 
 
 87. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965); see also PROSSER, supra 
note 20, § 75, at 494. 
 88. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (“One who sells any product in a 
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is 
subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer . . . .”); 
see also GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18, at 284–88. 
 89. 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944). 
 90. Id. at 443. 
 91. See id.  When the Restatement (Second) of Torts adopted this view, the theory of 
strict product liability became a “national standard.” Leahy, supra note 63, at 354. 
 92. See GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18, at 274–76; see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A. 
 93. See infra notes 142–58 and accompanying text; see also GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, 
supra note 18, at 271 (noting that product liability suits became a “staple of tort litigation” 
and were brought as a result of injuries from, among others products, “foodstuffs, vehicles, 
appliances, drugs, cosmetics, tobacco, alcohol, weapons, airplanes, boats, asbestos, 
construction materials, paints, fertilizers, medical devices, [and] tools”). 
 94. See IRVING J. SELIKOFF & DOUGLAS H. LEE, ASBESTOS AND DISEASE 5 (1978). 
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hundreds of thousands of claims against companies in every industry.  
Moreover, the defendants have grown more “peripheral,” moving from 
asbestos manufacturers, to premises owners, to third-party product 
manufacturers.  Lastly, Part II.C introduces the emergence of “peripheral 
plaintiffs,” individuals who were indirectly exposed to asbestos by 
employees who worked around the mineral on a daily basis. 
A.  Overview of Asbestos 
The term “asbestos” refers to several naturally occurring minerals, 
including chrysotile, crocidolite, amosite, anthophyllite, tremolite, and 
actinolite that exist as bundles of fibers.95  These fibers have durable and 
fire resistant qualities, and can be woven together.96  Due to these 
characteristics, companies mined asbestos extensively and used it in a 
variety of different industries.97  The building and construction industries 
used it pervasively for insulation, fireproofing, roofing, and sound 
absorption.98  The shipbuilding industry used asbestos to insulate boilers, 
steam pipes and hot water pipes.99  The automobile industry used it in 
vehicle brake shoes and clutch pads.100 
Although asbestos has extremely useful properties, researchers 
discovered that the minerals posed serious health hazards.101  Reports of a 
link between asbestos and lung cancer appeared as early as the 1930s.102  
Scientists in England studied individuals who worked in asbestos mines and 
discovered that they had a high risk of developing lung cancer as a result of 
 
 95. See See Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2642(3) (2006); Standards for 
Exposure to Asbestos Dust, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001(b) (2011). 
 96. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 13; see also Christopher J. O’Malley, Note, 
Breaking Asbestos Litigation’s Chokehold on the American Judiciary, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1101, 1101–02 (citing RACHEL MAINES, ASBESTOS AND FIRE:  TECHNOLOGICAL TRADE-OFFS 
AND THE BODY AT RISK 19 (2005) (stating that the lowest fire death rate in the United States 
occurred simultaneously with the use of 1.5 billion pounds of asbestos)). 
 97. See Fact Sheet:  Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, supra note 4; see also 
SELIKOFF & LEE, supra note 94, at 16–20 (noting that some asbestos products included 
asbestos yarn, cloth, tape, paper, pipes, and insulation). 
 98. See Fact Sheet:  Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, supra note 4; see also 
Craighead, supra note 9, at 51–54. 
 99. See Fact Sheet:  Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, supra note 4.  The United 
States government commissioned the use of asbestos to fireproof ships during World War II.  
During that time, 4.5 million Americans were employed in shipyards and exposed to the risk 
of asbestos inhalation. Paul D. Carrington, Asbestos Lessons:  The Consequences of Asbestos 
Litigation, 26 REV. LITIG. 583, 586–87 (2007). 
 100. See Fact Sheet:  Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, supra note 4; see also 
Craighead, supra note 9, at 63–68. 
 101. See BARRY L. CASTLEMAN, ASBESTOS:  MEDICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 5–9 (5th ed. 
2005); SELIKOFF & LEE, supra note 94, at 20–30. 
 102. See Richard Doll, Mortality from Lung Cancer in Asbestos Workers, 12 BRIT. J. 
INDUS. MED. 81, 81 (1955) (noting that in 1935, British scientists Kenneth Lynch and Atmar 
Smith published the first case report of a patient who developed lung cancer as a result of 
asbestos exposure).  Well before these epidemiological studies surfaced, the Ancient 
Romans in the first century also recognized the health hazards associated with asbestos.  
Pliny the Elder even suggested that slaves who handled asbestos should use transparent 
bladder skins as respirators to prevent asbestos fiber inhalation. Ira Pilchen, Asbestos, “The 
Magic Mineral,” Creates Toxic Tort “Avalanche,” 75 JUDICATURE 320 (1992). 
464 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
their exposure to asbestos, with the risk increasing in proportion to the 
length of employment.103  In the United States, Dr. Irving Selikoff 
conducted the first groundbreaking work on asbestos-related diseases while 
at the Mt. Sinai School of Medicine in New York in 1964.104  Like the 
British studies, this study also found a causal connection between asbestos 
exposure and an increased risk of cancer.105  When Congress eventually 
passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act106 in 1970 and created 
OSHA, the agency quickly sought to regulate asbestos.107 
In 1972, OSHA set forth a series of strict guidelines for controlling 
asbestos exposure in the workplace.108  These regulations established a 
permissible exposure limit, as well as requirements for providing 
employees with respiratory equipment while handling asbestos, special 
clothing for use during the workday, changing rooms, and laundry facilities 
in order to isolate the asbestos-containing clothing.109  As evidence of 
asbestos’s harmful effects mounted, the Environmental Protection Agency 
proposed banning all products containing asbestos.110  Although the 
proposal was set aside,111 some products containing asbestos were 
banned.112 
Ten years after the proposed ban, one journalist called asbestos “the 
worst occupational health disaster in U.S. history.”113  Researchers have 
estimated that from 1985 to 2009, more than 225,000 deaths would occur as 
 
 103. See Doll, supra note 102, at 86; see also CASTLEMAN, supra note 101, at 42–44. 
 104. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 14.  Although significant research on asbestos 
exposure was not conducted in the United States until the 1960s, evidence exists that the 
asbestos industry knew about the dangers of the product since the 1930s.  Records from 
companies like Johns-Manville indicate that corporate officials concealed the risks of 
asbestos exposure from their workers. See Hensler, supra note 10, at 258. 
 105. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 14. 
 106. Pub. L. No. 94-469, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2006)) 
(“The Congress declares it to be its purpose and policy . . . to assure so far as possible every 
working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions . . . .”). 
 107. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 13; see also CASTLEMAN, supra note 101, at 
269 (“The asbestos industry knew [asbestos] would be one of the first regulatory targets of 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).”). 
 108. See Standards for Exposure to Asbestos Dust, 29 C.F.R. § 1910 (2011). 
 109. See id.  The 1972 regulations demonstrated an effort to warn and protect not only the 
employees, but also those who may come into contact with asbestos carried on the 
employees’ person from harm. See id. 
 110. See Asbestos; Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and Distribution in Commerce 
Prohibitions, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,460, 29,467 (July 12, 1989) (“EPA has concluded that the 
continued manufacture, importation, and processing of the asbestos-containing products that 
are identified in the rule poses an unreasonable risk of injury to human health.”). 
 111. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. E.P.A., 947 F.2d 1201, 1229–30 (5th Cir. 1991); see 
also CASTLEMAN, supra note 101, at 454. 
 112. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 13.  It is important to note that asbestos is only 
harmful once it is disturbed. When disturbed, inhalation of its fibers can be lethal. Fact 
Sheet:  Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, supra note 4. 
 113. Dennis Cauchon, “Nobody Can Plead Ignorance”:  At Least 1 Million Likely To Die 
Over 30 Years in Poor Nations, USA TODAY, Feb. 8, 1999, at 4A.  Others, however, point 
out asbestos’s lifesaving properties.  Because of its fire-resistant qualities “[i]t is not unlikely 
that tens or even hundreds of thousands of Americans were spared a scorching death because 
of the use of asbestos.” Carrington, supra note 99, at 587. 
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a result of asbestos exposure from 1940 to 1979.114  One of the most salient 
points about asbestos-related diseases is that they have a very long latency 
period; symptoms can surface more than fifteen years after an individual’s 
first exposure.115  As a result, many people will not show symptoms until 
decades after they have already left their places of employment.116 
Doctors have linked several different cancers to asbestos exposure.117  
Mesothelioma represents the most severe of the asbestos-related cancers 
and affects the lining of the chest or abdomen.118  Asbestos exposure is the 
only cause of mesothelioma, and the disease is always fatal, with death 
occurring from several months to a year or two after diagnosis.119  An 
individual does not need exposure to high levels of asbestos to contract 
mesothelioma.120  Asbestos exposure can also cause various other cancers, 
such as lung cancer.121  Mesothelioma and lung cancer represent the two 
most common malignant diseases related to asbestos exposure.122  
However, smoking and other factors can also cause lung cancer, which can 
complicate the analysis of causation in asbestos cases.123 
Asbestos exposure also causes various nonmalignant diseases of the 
lungs.124  Asbestosis results in a scarring of the lung tissue that occurs when 
an individual inhales asbestos fibers and they become lodged in the 
lungs.125  Asbestosis is usually not fatal and is often not debilitating.126  The 
severity of the disease increases with the level of exposure and can range 
 
 114. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 16. 
 115. See Asbestos:  Health Facts, AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY 
(Apr. 1, 2008), http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/asbestos/asbestos/health_effects/index.html; see 
also David Weill, Diagnostic Features and Clinical Evaluation of the Asbestos-Associated 
Diseases, in ASBESTOS AND ITS DISEASES, supra note 8, at 253, 254. 
 116. See Asbestos:  Health Facts, supra note 115; see also CASTLEMAN, supra note 101, 
at 196. 
 117. See Asbestos:  Health Facts, supra note 115 (noting that factors that impact the 
development of disease include exposure concentration, duration, and frequency, as well as 
the chemical composition of the specific asbestos fibers). 
 118. See id.; see also CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 17; SELIKOFF & LEE, supra note 
94, at 243–44. 
 119. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 17; see also Harvey I. Pass et al., Therapeutic 
Approaches to Malignant Mesothelioma, in ASBESTOS AND ITS DISEASES, supra note 8, at 
326, 326–27. 
 120. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 17; CASTLEMAN, supra note 101, at 429 (noting 
that “levels of exposure insufficient to produce asbestosis can nonetheless cause cancer”). 
 121. See Fact Sheet:  Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, supra note 4 (stating that some 
studies suggest that asbestos exposure can increase risks for gastrointestinal and colorectal 
cancers, as well as cancers of the throat, kidneys, esophagus, and gallbladder); see also 
Richard Attanoos, Lung Cancer Associated with Asbestos Exposure, in ASBESTOS AND ITS 
DISEASES, supra note 8, at 172, 172–86. 
 122. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 17. 
 123. See id. (noting that because of the high rate of smoking in blue-collar industries 
where workers were exposed to asbestos, defendants often try to associate the plaintiffs’ lung 
cancer with smoking rather than asbestos exposure); see also Attanoos, supra note 121, at 
174. 
 124. See Fact Sheet:  Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, supra note 4. 
 125. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 17; see also CASTLEMAN, supra note 101, at 9–
10. 
 126. John E. Craighead, Benign Pleural and Parenchymal Diseases Associated with 
Asbestos Exposure, in ASBESTOS AND ITS DISEASES, supra note 8, at 139, 145–46. 
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from debilitating to only mildly impairing.127  Other results of asbestos 
exposure include pleural thickening—a scarring of the membrane that 
surrounds the lungs—and pleural effusions, collections of fluid between 
layers of tissue lining the lungs or chest cavity.128  As employees began to 
develop symptoms of these diseases, thousands of claims poured into state 
and federal courts across the country.129 
B.  An “Elephantine Mass” of Asbestos Litigation 
The history of asbestos has been described as “a tale of danger known in 
the 1930s, exposure inflicted upon millions of Americans in the 1940s and 
1950s, injuries that began to take their toll in the 1960s, and a flood of 
lawsuits beginning in the 1970s.”130  As discussed, the latency period for 
asbestos-related diseases could last as long as thirty or forty years, and 
therefore, employees did not bring claims until decades after their initial 
exposures.131  But when they did bring suit, employees first turned to the 
remedy of workers’ compensation.132  With epidemiological studies as 
evidence, employees sought to recover lost wages and medical costs 
resulting from asbestos-related diseases.133 
Many of these claims proved unsuccessful, however, because workers’ 
compensation administrators often stated that the nexus between the 
employee’s disease and the asbestos exposure that occurred decades ago 
was too tenuous, or that the statute of limitations for bringing claims had 
passed.134  The employees that did get compensation typically received 
only a fraction of their lost wages and no damages for pain and suffering.135  
Moreover, the workers’ compensation system did not provide a strong 
incentive for employers to stop utilizing asbestos.136 
When workers’ compensation statutes proved unsatisfactory, employees 
turned to tort law and began to file claims against asbestos manufacturers 
for negligence and strict products liability.137  Some states, however, 
 
 127. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 17. 
 128. See id.; see also Fact Sheet:  Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, supra note 4. 
 129. See GRIFFIN B. BELL, ASBESTOS LITIGATION AND JUDICIAL LEADERSHIP:  THE 
COURTS’ DUTY TO HELP SOLVE THE ASBESTOS LITIGATION CRISIS 2–3 (2002) (noting that 
20,000 cases were pending since 1984). 
 130. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. AD HOC COMM. ON ASBESTOS LITIG., REPORT OF 
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION 2–3 (1991). 
 131. See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text. 
 132. See Hensler, supra note 10, at 259; see also CASTLEMAN, supra note 101, at 143–45. 
 133. See Hensler, supra note 10, at 259. 
 134. See id. at 259–60; see also CASTLEMAN, supra note 101, at 170 (stating that workers’ 
compensation claims “appear to have been bitterly contested, with payments delayed through 
every legal means”). 
 135. See Leahy, supra note 63, at 350 (noting that workers often received only half to 
two-thirds of lost wages); see also CASTLEMAN, supra note 101, at 197 (stating that, when 
exposure occurred a long time ago, compensation awards could be “pitifully small”). 
 136. See Leahy, supra note 63, at 350 (noting that the small amount that employers had to 
compensate their employees did not prove to be a successful deterrent). 
 137. See CASTLEMAN, supra note 101, at 197–98 (noting that because of the difficulty of 
getting adequate workers’ compensation “it is not surprising” that workers began to file civil 
suits against asbestos manufacturers); see also Rebecca Leah Levine, Clearing the Air:  
2012] THE “PERIPHERAL PLAINTIFF” 467 
prevented plaintiffs from bringing claims because their exposure occurred 
many years before, and the statute of limitations had already run138:  the 
permissible time to bring a claim began with the first instance of exposure, 
and had therefore expired.139  State legislatures realized that because of the 
long latency period, plaintiffs could not be expected to file claims before 
noticing that they were sick.140  Legislatures therefore changed the statute 
of limitations to require plaintiffs to file claims within a year or two after 
they knew, or should have known, of their injury.141 
The first significant success for plaintiffs occurred in 1973 when the 
court in Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.142 held that 
manufacturers of asbestos-containing products could be strictly liable for 
injuries resulting from exposure to asbestos.143  The decision in Borel gave 
employees the confidence to begin to bring more product liability 
lawsuits.144  Moreover, as a result of the asbestos standards that OSHA set 
in 1972, plaintiffs’ attorneys could argue that asbestos manufacturers did 
not attempt to regulate levels of exposure, further bolstering their claims.145 
Plaintiffs found increased success after legislatures adjusted the typical 
requirements of proving causation to account for the long latency period for 
asbestos-related diseases.146  In a product liability case, plaintiffs must 
usually prove that the defendant’s product caused them harm.147  In the case 
of asbestos exposure, however, plaintiffs must prove that the defendant’s 
product represented a substantial factor in bringing about their disease and 
that the product was at the site and in the proximity of where the plaintiff 
worked.148  Often plaintiffs meet this burden of proof through 
circumstantial evidence.149  In other contexts, plaintiffs can name the 
 
Ordinary Negligence in Take-Home Asbestos Exposure Litigation, 86 WASH. L. REV. 359, 
370 (2011).  Employees could not bring separate claims against their employers under 
common law tort liability for injuries relating to asbestos exposure when there existed an 
applicable workers’ compensation law. Daniel J. Penofsky, Annotation, Asbestos Injury 
Litigation, 60 AM. JUR. Trials § 39 (1996). 
 138. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 22. 
 139. See  id; see also Joel E. Smith, Annotation, When Statute of Limitations Begins to 
Run as to Cause of Action for Development of Latent Industrial or Occupational Disease, 1 
A.L.R. 4TH 117 (1980) (“[W]here an injury . . . is sustained in consequence of the wrongful 
act of another, the statute of limitations attaches at once, and the running of the statute is not 
postponed by the fact that the actual or substantial damages do not occur until a later date.”). 
 140. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 22–23. 
 141. See id. 
 142. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 143. See id. at 1081; see also CASTLEMAN, supra note 101, at 319 (calling the case 
“precedent setting”). 
 144. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 2; Hensler, supra note 10, at 260 (“Borel 
opened the doors to the courthouse for workers who had been injured by exposure to 
asbestos.”). 
 145. See Leahy, supra note 63, at 357 (“Plaintiffs could now rely on the OSHA standards 
as a measure of reasonable conduct.”). 
 146. See Christopher W. Jackson, Note, Taking Duty Home:  Why Asbestos Litigation 
Reform Should Give Courts the Confidence to Recognize A Duty to Second-Hand Exposure 
Victims, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1157, 1162–63 (2010). 
 147. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
 148. See 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 72 (2011). 
 149. See id. 
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products that they handled, but in asbestos suits plaintiffs often cannot 
remember the names of products they worked with thirty or forty years 
ago.150  Therefore, some courts now allow testimony from co-workers 
stating that other employees used the defendant’s asbestos-containing 
products at the worksite at the same time that the plaintiff worked there.151  
Others require that the plaintiff demonstrate that the defendant’s product 
was used frequently at the worksite, and that the plaintiff regularly worked 
in its proximity.152  The long latency period unique to asbestos-related 
diseases has thus resulted in certain accommodations for proving 
causation.153 
The growth of asbestos litigation put a large strain on asbestos 
manufacturers.154  By 1982, for example, plaintiffs filed 6,000 cases a year 
against Johns-Manville,155 and at the end of that year the asbestos-
producing giant had filed for bankruptcy.156  As claims flooded the courts, 
more and more corporations were forced into bankruptcy.157  Researchers 
have estimated that by 2002, more than seventy-five companies declared 
bankruptcy as a result of asbestos litigation, and asbestos plaintiffs received 
more than $70 billion.158 
As asbestos manufacturers went bankrupt, plaintiffs “cast their litigation 
net wider” and turned to more “peripheral” defendants.159  Many plaintiffs 
 
 150. See id. (“A plaintiff injured by asbestos fibers often does not know exactly when or 
where he or she was injured and therefore is unable to describe the details of how such injury 
occurred.”). 
 151. E.g., Lane v. Celotex Corp., 782 F.2d 1526, 1528 (11th Cir. 1986) (“[R]ecovery will 
require the plaintiff to show that he was exposed to defendant’s asbestos-containing product 
by working with or in close proximity to the product.” (quoting Blackston v. Shook & 
Fletcher Insulation Co., 764 F.2d 1480, 1481 (11th Cir. 1985))). 
 152. E.g., Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1162–63 (4th Cir. 
1986) (“To support a reasonable inference of substantial causation from circumstantial 
evidence, there must be evidence of exposure to a specific product on a regular basis over 
some extended period of time in proximity to where the plaintiff actually worked.”). 
 153. For a critique of what he deems the loosening of traditional elements of tort law, see 
BELL, supra note 129, at 11, which states that plaintiffs will “invariably identify the product 
of solvent companies that have available funds to pay inventory settlements” and that such a 
system “rarely accommodates a determination of whether plaintiffs made valid product 
identification.” 
 154. See Hensler, supra note 10, at 261 (noting that the filing of claims quickly increased 
in states that contained industries like shipbuilding, which had a high risk of asbestos 
exposure); see also CASTLEMAN, supra note 101, at 198. 
 155. See Leahy, supra note 63, at 361. 
 156. See id.; see also CASTLEMAN, supra note 101, at 199.  Many in the industry felt 
shocked by the bankruptcy of Johns-Manville, which had advertised itself as the “largest 
producer of asbestos-based products in the United States.” Leahy, supra note 63, at 361 n.19. 
 157. See Anita Bernstein, Asbestos Achievements, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 691, 691 (2008); see 
also CASTLEMAN, supra note 101, at 201. 
 158. See Bernstein, supra note 157, at 691. 
 159. See Mark A. Behrens & Phil Goldberg, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis:  The Tide 
Appears to Be Turning, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 477, 484–85 (2006) (quoting Editorial, Lawyers 
Torch the Economy, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2001, at A14); Susan Warren, Asbestos Quagmire:  
Plaintiffs Target Companies Whose Premises Contained Any Form of Deadly Material, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2003, at B1; see also CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 31 (“Plaintiff 
attorneys sought out new defendants and pressed defendants that they had heretofore treated 
as peripheral to the litigation for more money.”). 
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filed claims against premises owners claiming that they behaved negligently 
in failing to exercise reasonable care to protect the plaintiffs from asbestos-
related harm.160  In a typical claim against a premises owner, an employee 
of an independent contractor hired by the owner will bring suit.161  Because 
the employees are invitees, or “business visitors” of the premises owner, the 
premises owner can be liable for harms that the employees suffer if it knew, 
or should have known, of the defective condition on its premises.162   
 Although plaintiffs initially limited their claims to asbestos 
manufacturers, more recently they have targeted much more numerous and 
varied companies.163  Researchers estimate that, as of 2002, over 6,000 
different companies spanning “the full range of American business” have 
been named as defendants in asbestos personal injury suits.164 
Along with premises owners, other “peripheral defendants” now include 
third-party product manufacturers, who produced parts that other parties 
later insulated with asbestos.165  For example, plaintiffs bring these types of 
claims against the manufacturers of pipes or valves that the purchasers 
would insulate with asbestos in order to improve functioning.166  Courts 
have approached these cases by asking whether the manufacturers had a 
duty to prevent the plaintiffs from asbestos-related harms when the 
manufacturers did not themselves use asbestos with their products.167  
Those courts that determine a duty existed find that the manufacturers often 
knew, or should have known, that their products would be used in 
conjunction with asbestos.168  Thus, the defendants should have foreseen 
that the people who ultimately handled their products would become 
exposed to the hazards of asbestos.169  Most courts, however, have rejected 
 
 160. See, e.g., In re All Me. Asbestos Litig., 581 F. Supp. 963, 977 (D. Me. 1984); see 
also CASTLEMAN, supra note 101, at 751. 
 161. See Kenneth R. Meyer et al., Emerging Trends in Asbestos Premises Liability 
Claims:  Understanding Current Theories of Liability and Proposed Legislation to Protect 
Your Client, 72 DEF. COUNS. J. 241, 242 (2005). 
 162. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 332, 343 (1965).  In some situations courts 
will state that the premises owner did not retain any control over the work of the independent 
contractor and therefore should not be held liable. E.g., Purcell v. Varian Med. Sys., Inc., 
No. A100725, 2004 WL 639852, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2004). 
 163. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 49; see also CASTLEMAN, supra note 101, at 
745 (noting that by 2004 asbestos litigation “involved thousands of corporate defendants” 
ranging from manufacturers to premises owners and insurers). 
 164. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 49. 
 165. See Paul J. Riehle et al., Products Liability for Third Party Replacement or 
Connected Parts:  Changing Tides from the West, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 33, 38 (2009); see also 
Beth M. Kramer et al., Recent Developments in Toxic Torts and Environmental Law, 46 
TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 635, 638–39 (2011). 
 166. E.g., Braaten v. Saberhagen Holdings, 198 P.3d 493, 495 (Wash. 2008). 
 167. See id.; see also O’Neil v. Crane Co., 266 P.3d 987 (Cal. 2012). 
 168. See Sawyer v. A.C. & S., Inc., No. 111152/99, 2011 WL 3764074, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. June 24, 2011) (“[A] manufacturer’s liability for third-party component parts must be 
determined by the degree to which injury from the component parts is foreseeable to the 
manufacturer.”); see also Chicano v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. Civ.A. 03-5126, 2004 WL 
2250990, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2004) (stating that there is “at least a genuine issue of 
material fact” as to whether the defendant could foresee that its product would be used with 
asbestos-containing insulation). 
 169. See Sawyer, 2011 WL 3764074, at *3. 
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these types of suits, holding that a manufacturer of a component part is not 
responsible for what is added to its product in the stream of commerce.170  
Although these types of claims have not met with great success,171 they 
nevertheless represent the widening of claims to more and more peripheral 
parties. 
Faced with what the Supreme Court characterized as an “asbestos-
litigation crisis,”172 Congress has tried numerous times to pass asbestos 
reforms.  In 1990, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist appointed the U.S. 
Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation to examine 
the effects of the crisis.173  A report published by the Committee in 1991 
concluded that “the situation has reached critical dimensions and is getting 
worse.  What has been a frustrating problem is becoming a disaster of major 
proportions . . . which the courts are ill-equipped to meet effectively.”174  
Notwithstanding the Committee’s call for Congressional action, attempts to 
pass legislation addressing the mass of asbestos claims have failed.175  In 
2005, the Senate Judiciary Committee approved the Fairness in Asbestos 
Injury Resolution Act,176  which would have established a $140 billion 
National Asbestos Trust Fund comprised of money from different bankrupt 
estates, as well as from companies that currently face asbestos liability.177  
The bill, however, never passed the Senate.178 
C.  The “Specter of Limitless Liability”:  Take-Home Asbestos Cases 
The new frontier for asbestos litigation has seen the emergence of take-
home asbestos cases.179  Alternatively referred to as “secondary” or 
“bystander” exposure cases, these claims are typically brought by members 
of the employee’s household who become exposed to asbestos through 
contact with the employee’s work clothes or with the employee’s person.180  
 
 170. See O’Neil, 266 P.3d at 996; see also Braaten, 198 P.3d at 498 (stating that its 
decision is “in accord with the majority rule nationwide:  a manufacturer’s duty to warn is 
restricted to warnings based on the characteristics of the manufacturer’s own products” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 171. See Braaten, 198 P.3d at 498. 
 172. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997). 
 173. See BELL, supra note 129, at 3. 
 174. See id. (quoting JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. AD HOC COMM. ON ASBESTOS 
LITIG., supra note 130, at 2 (1991)). Some of the specific problems that the Committee 
pointed to include long delays, the same issues being relitigated, high transaction costs, and 
the possibility that future claimants may not be able to recover as a result of the diminishing 
of assets. Id. at 3. 
 175. See Lester Brickman, An Analysis of the Financial Impact of S. 852:  The Fairness 
in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2005, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 1003–06 (2005). 
 176. S. 852, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 177. See Carrington, supra note 99, at 596. 
 178. See id. 
 179. See Behrens & Cruz-Alvarez, supra note 11, at 1.  Behrens and Cruz-Alvarez note 
the evolution of asbestos litigation.  In the beginning, it involved plaintiffs suing asbestos 
products manufacturers. Id.  Then, plaintiffs would bring claims against “peripheral 
defendants” like premises owners because the manufacturers had filed for bankruptcy. Id.  
Now, the litigation has moved to “peripheral plaintiffs” who seek to hold premises owners 
liable for secondary exposure. Id. 
 180. See Behrens, supra note 14, at 545–46. 
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Take-home exposure plaintiffs bring claims against, among other 
defendants, the employers, and often the premises owners, particularly in 
cases where the employee worked for an independent contractor.181  The 
central issue in these cases is whether the defendant owed a duty to the 
plaintiff to prevent him from the harm associated with asbestos exposure.182 
Although employees typically cannot bring a claim against their 
employers because of workers’ compensation statutes, take-home asbestos 
plaintiffs do not face this restriction.183  As will be discussed in greater 
detail in Part III, these plaintiffs often assert that the employer breached its 
duty of care by failing to warn its employees of the dangers of asbestos 
exposure or was negligent in failing to maintain a safe working 
environment.184  Courts wrestling with the issue of whether to apply a duty 
of care have utilized many of the factors discussed in Part I.B above, such 
as foreseeability, the nature of the relationship between the parties, and 
whether the defendants’ actions constituted misfeasance or nonfeasance.185  
The history of asbestos litigation has also informed the courts decisions, 
and the policy implications of their holdings often play a role in duty 
determinations.186 
III.  STATE SPLIT ON WHETHER EMPLOYERS OWE A DUTY TO 
FAMILY MEMBERS INJURED BY TAKE-HOME ASBESTOS 
Part III details the conflict between state courts that determine that 
employer and landowner defendants owe a duty to third-party plaintiffs to 
protect them from asbestos-related injuries, and state courts that hold that 
the defendants owe no duty to third-party plaintiffs. 
A. States That Find Employers Owe a Duty 
Part III.A. of this Note examines the opinions of the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey and the Tennessee Supreme Court, which both held that 
landowners and employers owe a duty to take-home asbestos plaintiffs to 
protect them from asbestos-related injuries.  In determining that a duty 
existed, both courts relied heavily on the foreseeability of the harm to the 
plaintiff. 
 
 181. See “Take-Home” Exposure Claims on the Rise, 39 Prod. Safety & Liability Rep. 
(BNA) 1229 (Nov. 7, 2011). 
 182. See id. 
 183. See supra notes 132–37 and accompanying text. 
 184. E.g., Price v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. 26 A.3d 162 (Del. 2011); CSX Transp., 
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(N.Y. 2005); Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347 (Tenn. 2008). 
 185. See Price, 26 A.3d 162; CSX Transp., Inc., 608 S.E.2d 208; In re Certified Question 
from the Fourteenth Dist. Ct. App. of Tex., 740 N.W.2d 206 (Mich. 2007); Olivo v. Owens-
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Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d 347. 
 186. See Price, 26 A.3d 162; CSX Transp., Inc., 608 S.E.2d 208; In re Certified Question, 
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1.  New Jersey:  Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. 
In Olivo v. Owens-Illinois,187 the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
examined the duty of a landowner to spouses handling workers’ asbestos-
covered clothing.188  The plaintiff, Anthony Olivo, worked as a steamfitter 
and welder for thirty-seven years between 1947 and 1984.189  Independent 
contractors hired him to work at different sites in New Jersey, including 
defendant Exxon Mobil’s refinery.190  During the course of his duties, Mr. 
Olivo routinely worked with asbestos-containing products such as pipe 
covering and gaskets.191  When Mr. Olivo came home each evening, he 
removed his asbestos-laden clothes, and left them for his wife, Eleanor 
Olivo, to wash.192  Doctors eventually diagnosed Mr. Olivo with a non-
malignant asbestos-related disease, while Mrs. Olivo was diagnosed with 
mesothelioma and died a year later.193 
Mr. Olivo, who brought suit on his wife’s behalf, alleged that Exxon 
Mobil breached its duty to maintain a safe working environment by failing 
to protect him and Mrs. Olivo from asbestos exposure.194  In turn, Exxon 
Mobil filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that it owed no duty 
to Mrs. Olivo because she did not sustain injuries on its premises.195  The 
trial court agreed with Exxon Mobil and granted the motion, stating that it 
would not be “fair or just”196 to impose a duty on a landowner to prevent 
injuries that occurred off premises.197  The Appellate Division reversed, 
holding that Exxon Mobil should have foreseen harm to Mrs. Olivo and that 
it stood in the best position to prevent the harm because the company could 
have warned the workers or provided changing facilities to minimize the 
risk of exposure.198 
In affirming the Appellate Division’s decision, the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey engaged in a two-step analysis to determine whether Exxon 
Mobil owed a duty of reasonable care to Mrs. Olivo.199  First, the court 
determined that the defendant should have foreseen the risk of harm to an 
individual like Mrs. Olivo.200  The court relied on a 1937 report for the 
petroleum industry, as well as hygiene texts dating back to 1916, to 
determine that Exxon Mobil knew of the dangers associated with prolonged 
asbestos exposure.201  Moreover, the court stated that it “requires no leap of 
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imagination” to recognize that during the course of his employment either 
Mr. Olivo or his spouse would have to launder his clothing and would 
therefore come into contact with asbestos.202  Therefore, the court held that 
Exxon could foresee the risk of asbestos exposure to a person like Mrs. 
Olivo. 
Second, the court applied a balancing analysis:  it examined “the 
relationship between the parties, the nature of the risk and how relatively 
easy it would have been to provide warnings,” and determined that these 
factors weighed in favor of imposing a duty on Exxon Mobil.203  The court 
responded to Exxon Mobil’s fear that using a foreseeability analysis would 
lead to limitless liability, stating that the holding applied specifically to the 
foreseeable harm that Mrs. Olivo experienced.204  Accordingly, the court’s 
duty analysis did not extend to every third party injured by take-home 
asbestos.205  Foreseeability, however, did play a crucial role in New 
Jersey’s determination of duty in cases of secondhand asbestos exposure.206 
2.  Tennessee:  Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co. 
Like the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Olivo, Tennessee’s highest 
court also held that a duty existed to protect those who came into regular 
contact with asbestos-containing clothes from harm.207   
For eight years plaintiff Doug Satterfield worked at defendant Alcoa, 
Inc., an international manufacturer of aluminum and aluminum products.208  
Many of the materials used by Alcoa contained asbestos, and as a result Mr. 
Satterfield routinely came into contact with asbestos dust.209  During his 
employment at Alcoa, Mr. Satterfield and his wife had a daughter, Amanda 
Nicole Satterfield.210  Amanda Satterfield spent the first three months of her 
life hospitalized because she was premature, and Mr. Satterfield visited her 
every day, going directly from work to the hospital.211  As a result, Amanda 
regularly came in contact with asbestos dust from her father’s work clothes, 
and at the age of twenty-five was diagnosed with mesothelioma, passing 
away shortly afterward.212 
Before her death, Amanda Satterfield alleged that Alcoa negligently 
allowed her father to wear his asbestos-containing clothes home, thus 
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474 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
repeatedly exposing her to asbestos fibers.213  In response, Alcoa filed a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that it owed no duty to Ms. 
Satterfield.214  The trial court granted the motion, but the Tennessee Court 
of Appeals reversed.215 
The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Alcoa owed a duty 
to those individuals who regularly came into contact with its employees’ 
asbestos-containing clothing.216  The court began its analysis by 
emphasizing that Alcoa’s actions constituted misfeasance, not 
nonfeasance.217  While individuals have a duty to refrain from affirmatively 
causing others harm, they generally do not have a duty to protect others 
from harm.218  Tennessee has espoused this rule, with the exception that 
when the parties have a special relationship, there exists a duty to protect 
the endangered party.219 
The court rejected Alcoa’s argument that because its act consisted of a 
failure to warn, and no special relationship existed between the company 
and Amanda Satterfield, it therefore owed no duty to her.220  The court held 
that, in determining if an action constitutes misfeasance or nonfeasance, a 
court must consider whether the individual’s entire conduct created an 
increased risk of harm, and not simply whether a specific act constituted a 
negligent omission.221  The court therefore characterized Alcoa’s actions as 
misfeasance, because “operating its facility in such an unsafe manner that 
dangerous asbestos fibers were transmitted outside the facility” constituted 
an affirmative act that created a risk of injury.222  When an individual 
engages in an injurious affirmative act, he has a duty to those injured by the 
act, no matter what the relationship is between the parties.223  Accordingly, 
because Alcoa engaged in affirmative acts of misfeasance, the court did not 
need to consider the relationship between it and Ms. Satterfield.224 
Although the analysis of misfeasance did not require an inquiry into the 
relationship of the parties, it did require the court to engage in a balancing 
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(Tentative Draft 2005)). 
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test before imposing a duty.225  Similar to the factors outlined by the New 
Jersey court, the Tennessee Supreme Court stated that a duty exists when 
“the degree of foreseeability of the risk and the gravity of the harm 
outweigh the burden that would be imposed if the defendant were required 
to engage in an alternative course of conduct that would have prevented the 
harm.”226  The court noted that foreseeability plays a significant role in this 
analysis.227  A duty exists when the harm from a course of conduct is 
foreseeable enough that a reasonable person would refrain from engaging in 
it.228 
Applying the balancing factors to Amanda Satterfield’s case, the court 
concluded that Alcoa knew the danger that asbestos posed and that it should 
have foreseen the harm that an individual, like Ms. Satterfield, could 
suffer.229  Moreover, Alcoa could have easily reduced the harm by, among 
other things, providing basic warnings about asbestos, offering laundry 
services to its employees, and encouraging employees to use on-site 
showers.230  Therefore, the court determined that Alcoa owed a duty of 
reasonable care to individuals like Ms. Satterfield.231 
Unlike the Supreme Court of New Jersey, Tennessee’s highest court did 
not limit this duty to the individual plaintiff.232  Instead, it determined that 
such a duty “extends to those who regularly and repeatedly come into close 
contact with an employee’s contaminated work clothes over an extended 
period of time, regardless of whether they live in the employee’s home or 
are a family member.”233  The court reasoned that because Alcoa created a 
foreseeable risk to such individuals, and did nothing to minimize this risk, 
Alcoa’s duty should extend beyond those in the immediate family of the 
employee.234  Rejecting Alcoa’s argument that such a finding would 
contribute to the “asbestos litigation crisis,” the court noted that Ms. 
Satterfield, who died of mesothelioma, represents the type of plaintiff 
whose claims courts should encourage.235  Moreover, if the financial burden 
does not fall upon actors like Alcoa, it will fall upon the victims themselves, 
a result the court does not support.236 
In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Janice M. Holder stated 
that the majority should not have relied on foreseeability in its 
determination of duty.237  Justice Holder argued that courts should instead 
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leave foreseeability for juries to consider when deciding breach and 
proximate cause.238  She expressed a concern that, “[b]y incorporating 
foreseeability into an analysis of duty, the majority transforms a factual 
question into a legal issue and expands the authority of judges at the 
expense of juries.”239  Thus, whether a defendant could foresee harm to the 
plaintiff plays a role in establishing whether the defendant’s actions were 
reasonable, which represents a determination of breach.240 
Justice Holder would have adopted the Third Restatement’s approach and 
hold that whenever a defendant’s conduct creates a risk of harm to the 
plaintiff, a duty of reasonable care arises.241  Only under certain specific 
circumstances, such as when countervailing policy considerations exist, 
should courts determine that the defendant owes no duty to the injured 
plaintiff.242  For example, Tennessee has held that property owners do not 
owe a duty to prevent a contractor from harm caused by a defect that the 
contractor has undertaken to repair.243  Justice Holder noted that while 
foreseeability represents a “notoriously malleable and indefinite 
concept,”244 the Third Restatement offers a clearer approach.245  When a 
plaintiff asserts that the defendant’s conduct harmed him, as the plaintiff 
did in this case, courts should presume a duty exists unless specific policy 
considerations weigh in favor of finding no duty.246 
B.  States That Decline to Impose a Duty 
Part III.B of this Note examines the opinions of the New York Court of 
Appeals, the Supreme Court of Georgia, the Michigan Supreme Court, and 
the Delaware Supreme Court, which all determined that employees and 
premises owners do not owe a duty to take-home asbestos plaintiffs.  In 
their decisions to deny duty, these courts focused on the lack of a 
relationship between the parties, the characterization of the defendants’ acts 
as nonfeasance, and the policy of limiting already massive asbestos 
litigation. 
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1.  New York:  In re New York City Asbestos Litigation 
In In re New York City Asbestos Litigation,247 the New York Court of 
Appeals held that an employer does not owe a duty to third parties to 
protect them from harm caused by asbestos exposure.248  The plaintiff, John 
Holdampf, worked for the defendant, the Port Authority, between 1960 and 
1996, doing various jobs that required him to handle asbestos-containing 
products.249  Mr. Holdampf’s wife, Elizabeth, was exposed to the asbestos 
dust when she washed her husband’s uniforms.250  Doctors diagnosed Mrs. 
Holdampf with mesothelioma in 2001.251 
Mr. and Mrs. Holdampf alleged that the Port Authority acted negligently 
in failing to warn its employees of the dangers of asbestos to themselves 
and to those who could foreseeably come into contact with asbestos-
containing materials.252  The Port Authority moved for summary judgment, 
stating that it owed no duty to Mrs. Holdampf, as she did not work for the 
Port Authority.253  The New York State Supreme Court granted the motion, 
stating that the Port Authority did not owe Mrs. Holdampf a duty to prevent 
her from harms associated with asbestos exposure.254  The court based its 
decision on Widera v. Ettco Wire & Cable Corp.,255 in which the Appellate 
Division held that an employer did not owe a duty to the plaintiff to prevent 
harm caused by in utero exposure to chemicals that a father brought home 
on his work clothes.256 
The Appellate Division, however, modified the Supreme Court’s order, 
distinguishing Widera on the grounds that it involved the question of 
injuries that occurred in utero.257  It also noted several decisions that held 
manufacturers of asbestos products liable for injuries to foreseeable third 
parties.258  The Appellate Division granted leave and certified the question 
of duty to the New York Court of Appeals.259 
The Court of Appeals, focusing on the lack of a relationship between 
Mrs. Holdampf and the Port Authority, found that there was no duty.260  
Unlike the Tennessee Supreme Court, the New York Court of Appeals 
stated that because the Port Authority did not employ Mrs. Holdampf, it did 
not have a duty to protect her from the danger caused by her husband’s 
asbestos-laden clothes.261  The court reasoned that because Mrs. 
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Holdampf’s claim was based on nonfeasance, a special relationship had to 
exist in order to find that the Port Authority owed a duty to her.262  In this 
case, the Port Authority had no relationship with Mrs. Holdampf and, 
moreover, was not in the best position to protect her from harm because any 
actions it may have taken depended upon Mr. Holdampf’s compliance.263 
The Court of Appeals also rejected New Jersey’s emphasis on 
foreseeability as an element of duty determinations.264  The court held that 
courts should not take foreseeability into account in determining whether a 
duty exists; rather, juries should use foreseeability to determine the duty’s 
scope.265  Unlike the Tennessee Supreme Court, the New York Court of 
Appeals stated that using foreseeability to find duty in this case could lead 
to endless liability.266  Instead, the court explained that the only way to curb 
this “specter” is to limit a finding of duty to those classes of plaintiffs who 
have a special relationship with the defendant.267  In cases that involve 
take-home asbestos, there is no special relationship between the defendant 
and the injured third party, and therefore no duty exists. 
2.  Georgia:  CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Williams 
The Supreme Court of Georgia, agreeing with the New York Court of 
Appeals, held that an employer does not owe a duty to third parties who 
sustained injuries off the employer’s premises.268  Three children of 
different employees brought a negligence claim in federal court against 
their fathers’ employer, CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSXT), for harms 
suffered as a result of their exposure to their fathers’ asbestos-containing 
work clothes.269  In addition, one of the employees brought a wrongful 
death action claiming that his wife died as a result of the same exposure.270  
CSXT filed a motion for summary judgment in both cases, claiming that it 
owed no duty to nonemployees to protect them from asbestos exposure 
away from the worksite.271 
The district court denied the motion, but granted CSXT leave to seek an 
interlocutory appeal, because this was a matter of first impression in 
Georgia.272  The Eleventh Circuit granted the interlocutory appeal and 
certified the question of whether an employer owes a duty to third parties 
 
 262. Id. at 119 (noting that in situations of nonfeasance a duty exists only “where there is 
a relationship either between the defendant and a third-person tortfeasor that encompasses 
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who sustain harms from employees’ asbestos-containing clothing to the 
Supreme Court of Georgia.273 
Georgia’s highest court declined to impose a duty because no 
relationship existed between the employer and the third parties.274  While 
an employer owes its employees a duty to maintain a safe environment, the 
plaintiffs did not work for CSXT.275  Like the New York Court of Appeals, 
the Supreme Court of Georgia stated that foreseeability should not play a 
role in determinations of duty.276  Moreover, from a policy perspective, the 
court noted that finding liability under these circumstances would “create an 
almost infinite universe of potential plaintiffs.”277 
3.  Michigan:  In re Certified Question from the Fourteenth District Court 
of Appeals of Texas 
The Michigan Supreme Court, in In re Certified Question from the 
Fourteenth District Court of Appeals of Texas,278 held that a premise owner 
does not owe a duty to injured third parties who had never entered the 
premises.279  Between 1954 and 1965, plaintiff Cleveland “John” Roland 
worked for independent contractors whom the defendant Ford Motor 
Company hired to reline the interiors of blast furnaces.280  The material that 
Mr. Roland used to reline the furnaces contained asbestos, which adhered to 
his clothing.281  The decedent Carolyn Miller, Mr. Rowland’s stepdaughter, 
washed the clothing.282  Doctors diagnosed her with mesothelioma in 1999, 
and she died a year later.283 
The plaintiffs brought a claim in Texas alleging that Ms. Miller’s 
mesothelioma resulted from her exposure to the asbestos that adhered to her 
stepfather’s clothing while he was working for Ford.284  After the trial court 
denied the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, a jury found for the 
plaintiffs and awarded them $9.5 million.285  Ford then filed a motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and after the trial court denied the 
motion, Ford appealed to the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals of 
Texas.286  The district court certified the question of whether a premises 
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owner owes a duty to third parties injured from asbestos exposure off the 
premises to the Michigan Supreme Court.287 
The Michigan Supreme Court considered multiple factors in determining 
that the defendant owed no duty to Ms. Miller.288  The court stated that, in 
examining whether a duty existed, it must consider whether the social 
benefits of imposing a duty outweigh the costs.289  This involves balancing 
factors such as “the relationship of the parties, the foreseeability of the 
harm, the burden on the defendant, and the nature of the risk presented.”290  
The relationship of the parties, however, represented the most pivotal 
factor, because it determined whether the defendant should have acted to 
protect the injured party from harm.291  The court noted that although it 
should consider foreseeability as one of the factors, it deemed the other 
considerations more important.292 
The court first considered the relationship between the defendant and Ms. 
Miller, and held that it was extremely tenuous.293  Ms. Miller did not work 
for the defendant, nor had she ever appeared on the defendant’s 
premises.294  The court then considered the burden on the defendant, and 
held that the burden would be severe, because the defendant would have to 
protect every individual who came into contact with its employees and the 
employees of its independent contractors.295  The nature of the risk prong, 
however, was serious because of the highly dangerous properties of 
asbestos.296  Nevertheless, the court held that the defendant could not 
foresee the risk, because during the period when Mr. Roland worked on the 
defendant’s premises, the risks relating to asbestos were not well known.297  
The four balancing factors thus weighed in favor of finding that no duty 
existed. 
Like the highest courts of New York and Georgia, the Michigan Supreme 
Court also expressed the fear of limitless liability for defendants.298  It 
noted that many corporations had already faced bankruptcy because of the 
crushing asbestos claims brought against them by employees.299  If liability 
was extended to third parties, then the number of plaintiffs would be 
uncontrollable and the cost of litigation would debilitate many 
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 291. Id. But see id. at 225 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority incorrectly 
stressed the relationship between the parties more than the other factors). 
 292. Id. at 212–13 (majority opinion). 
 293. Id. at 216. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. at 217. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. at 218. But see id. at 226 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for 
looking to other courts’ determinations of what was known about asbestos at the time instead 
of considering foreseeability in the context of the present case). 
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defendants.300  Accordingly, policy considerations, as well as the four 
balancing factors, promoted a finding that landowners did not owe a duty to 
warn third parties who have never appeared on the landowner’s premises of 
the risks of asbestos.301 
Justice Michael F. Cavanagh dissented, arguing first that the majority 
should not have even decided the question of duty in this case, and further, 
that its analysis was incorrect because a duty existed.302  Justice Cavanagh 
criticized the majority for resolving the issue without the benefit of a full 
review.303  Because the majority did decide the issue, however, he felt 
compelled to state his disagreement with the analysis as well.  Justice 
Cavanagh first stated that the majority placed an undue emphasis on the 
lack of relationship between Ford and Ms. Miller.304  According to Justice 
Cavanagh, the court should not consider the relationship as the most 
important factor to weigh, but only one among many.305  In any case, 
Justice Cavanagh found that a relationship existed between Ms. Miller and 
the employer who, knowing the dangerous properties of asbestos, allowed 
employees to carry it home.306 
Next, he opined that the majority exaggerated the burden that a finding of 
duty would impose on future defendants.307  If the majority found that a 
duty existed in this particular circumstance, it would not follow that 
companies would then face liability for every person that comes into 
contact with asbestos carried home on their workers’ clothing.308  Even if a 
finding of duty would place a large burden on defendants, Justice Cavanagh 
stated that the benefits of “corporate accountability” and a “valued, healthy 
society” nevertheless would outweigh that burden, especially considering 
the extremely dangerous properties of asbestos.309 
Justice Cavanagh also criticized the majority’s decision regarding the 
foreseeability of harm to individuals like Ms. Miller.310  He cited several 
cases, including Olivo,311 which found that the risks of asbestos were 
known during the time that Mr. Roland worked for Ford.312  Moreover, 
Justice Cavanagh pointed out that the jury clearly believed that Ford should 
have foreseen the harm to Ms. Miller when it found for the plaintiffs, and 
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deciding otherwise undermines the jury’s determination.313  Foreseeability, 
he stated, represents a fact-specific determination that the majority should 
not have decided.314 
4.  Delaware:  Price v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. 
The Delaware Supreme Court, like the New York Court of Appeals, 
found that an employer does not owe a duty to protect third parties from 
harm because the defendant’s inaction constituted nonfeasance.315  Plaintiff 
Bobby Price worked as a maintenance technician for E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours & Co. between 1957 and 1991.316  His duties required him to 
work with asbestos-containing products.  His wife, Patricia Price, was also 
exposed to asbestos when she handled his work clothes and consequently 
developed an asbestos-related lung disease.317 
Mrs. Price filed a complaint against, among other parties, DuPont 
alleging that the company caused her injuries by exposing her to 
asbestos.318  She then sought to amend her complaint to recharacterize 
DuPont’s actions as misfeasance instead of nonfeasance.319  A special 
master denied the motion, finding that despite the attempt to recharacterize 
DuPont’s actions, the complaint would still fail to state a claim for 
misfeasance.320  The Superior Court affirmed, and Mrs. Price appealed.321 
The Delaware Supreme Court held that no duty existed because the 
defendant’s behavior constituted nonfeasance and no special relationship 
existed between the parties.322  The court stated that when an individual 
engages in acts of misfeasance, he owes a general duty to those whom his 
conduct harms.323  In contrast, when the person’s acts constitute 
nonfeasance, no duty exists to protect others unless there is a special 
relationship between the parties.324  The court held that the defendant’s 
failure to prevent Mr. Price from taking his clothes home, or its failure to 
warn of the dangers of asbestos, constituted nonfeasance.325  An attempt to 
recharacterize those actions without presenting any new facts does not 
transform acts of nonfeasance into acts of misfeasance.326  Because the 
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defendant had no special relationship to Mrs. Price, a third party, the court 
held that the defendant owed her no duty.327 
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Carolyn Berger stated that the majority 
should have found that DuPont’s actions constituted misfeasance.328  
Justice Berger noted that for nonfeasance, a defendant has not created a new 
risk for the plaintiff, but has simply failed to step in to benefit the 
plaintiff.329  In the present case, DuPont’s affirmative act of releasing the 
asbestos clearly created a new risk of harm to Mrs. Price.330  Justice Berger 
contended that the majority should not focus on specific instances of 
inaction, such as failing to warn Mr. and Mrs. Price, to find that DuPont’s 
conduct constituted nonfeasance.331  Instead, the company’s actions as a 
whole, which comprised utilizing asbestos at its worksite and allowing it to 
leave the worksite on employees’ clothes, demonstrated misfeasance.332 
Justice Berger also noted that once the court characterized the 
defendant’s actions as misfeasance, it needed to determine whether the 
defendants could foresee harm to the plaintiff.333  Assuming Mrs. Price’s 
allegations were true, DuPont knew the hazards of asbestos, that employees 
could easily transport asbestos on their clothing, and therefore, that 
individuals like Mrs. Price could sustain injuries from asbestos exposure.334  
Justice Berger would have therefore found that DuPont should have 
foreseen harm to Mrs. Price and would have reversed the trial court’s 
decision.335 
IV.  DELINEATING A CLEARER APPROACH TO DUTY DETERMINATIONS IN 
TAKE-HOME ASBESTOS CASES 
Part IV.A argues that the standard applied by all six states is too fact-
specific and uncertain.  Part IV.B suggests that the Third Restatement’s 
approach represents a clearer method. 
A.  The Present Duty Standard Is Unworkable 
Part IV.A.1 asserts that when courts decide whether a defendant owes a 
duty to take-home asbestos plaintiffs, they often usurp the role of the jury 
by engaging in fact-specific inquiries.  Part IV.A.2 criticizes courts that 
hold that no duty exists for burying their policy determinations in doctrines 
like nonfeasance, unforeseeability, and the lack of a relationship between 
the parties. 
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1.  Foreseeability’s “Schizophrenic Existence” in Duty Determinations 
When determining whether a duty attaches in take-home asbestos cases, 
courts often engage in fact-specific inquiries about foreseeability.336  The 
question of duty, unlike breach and proximate cause, represents one that a 
court must determine as a matter of law.337  Accordingly, whether a 
defendant owed a plaintiff a duty of reasonable care should not depend on 
the particular facts of a case.  Nevertheless, courts will often question 
whether a defendant could foresee harm to a particular plaintiff or class of 
plaintiffs.338  This analysis involves necessarily fact-specific inquiries into 
whether the defendant should have known about the hazards of asbestos 
during the time of the plaintiff’s exposure, whether the defendant provided 
any laundry or shower facilities to its workers, and the extent of the 
plaintiff’s exposure.339 
Decisions based on foreseeability do not provide clear precedents for 
future cases.  When a court determines that a defendant either could or 
could not have foreseen harm to a plaintiff, the court limits its holding to 
the facts of that case.340  Other courts later facing the same issue can reach a 
different interpretation of foreseeability simply by distinguishing the facts 
from the previous case.341  Thus, using foreseeability may help to resolve 
the particular case before the court, but it does nothing to resolve the larger 
conflict about duty to third-party asbestos plaintiffs. 
Duty determinations that use foreseeability can also cause inconsistencies 
between the judge and the jury, who can reach different conclusions about 
the same set of facts.342  As Part I.A.2–3 explained, foreseeability plays a 
role in the jury’s determination about the reasonableness of the defendant’s 
conduct and the scope of his liability.343  When judges decide 
foreseeability, their conclusions overlap with inquiries that the court should 
leave to the jury when it determines breach and proximate cause.344  As 
Justice Holder pointed out, such decisions represent judgments about 
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behavioral norms in the community, and a group of twelve people is much 
better qualified to make such conclusions than one judge.345 
2.  Courts Bury Policy Determinations in Doctrine 
Although most of the states that found no duty made references to the 
public policy considerations that informed their decisions, they couched 
these considerations in various doctrines like a lack of foreseeability, 
nonfeasance, and the absence of a relationship between the parties.346  
Foreseeability, as mentioned in Part IV.A.1, represents a fact-specific 
inquiry that courts should leave to juries.347  Characterizing a defendant’s 
actions as nonfeasance, and denying duty because no relationship existed 
between the parties, distorts basic tort law principles.  When a defendant 
engages in acts of nonfeasance, he has not created a new risk of harm to a 
plaintiff, but has merely failed to protect him from an already existing 
harm.348  In take-home asbestos cases, defendants create the risk by 
exposing workers to asbestos, which the workers then carry home on their 
person and clothing.349  Thus, the defendants have not engaged in 
nonfeasance because they created a dangerous environment that resulted in 
third-party exposure.350 
The real concern for courts that make “no duty” determinations in take-
home asbestos cases lies in the perceived endless liability that defendants 
would face if the court found that a duty existed.  The highest courts of 
New York and Georgia worried about the “specter of endless liability”351 
and the “infinite universe of potential plaintiffs.”352  Nevertheless, the 
courts determined that duty did not exist because of nonfeasance, lack of a 
relationship between the parties, or lack of foreseeability of harm to the 
plaintiff.353  These doctrines obfuscate the policy decisions that truly inform 
courts’ determinations.  When courts expressly state their policy reasons 
instead of engaging in multi-factored tests, they contribute to greater 
transparency in take-home asbestos cases.354 
B.  The Third Restatement’s Method Represents a Better Solution 
Part IV.B.1 argues that the Third Restatement results in clearer duty 
determinations in take-home asbestos cases because it establishes a default 
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duty of reasonable care and leaves fact-specific inquiries like foreseeability 
to the jury.  Part IV.B.2 maintains that the Third Restatement contributes to 
transparency in “no duty” decisions and encourages courts to take their “no 
duty” determinations more seriously. 
1.  Applying the Third Restatement Leads to Clearer, Less Fact-
Specific Decisions 
The Third Restatement’s approach to duty determinations removes 
factual inquiries from the judge and shifts them to the jury.  The 
Restatement eliminates the use of fact-specific inquiries like 
foreseeability.355  It instead states that “[a]n actor ordinarily has a duty to 
exercise reasonable care when the actor’s conduct creates a risk of physical 
harm.”356  It thus establishes a default duty of reasonable care when a 
defendant’s conduct was a cause-in-fact of a plaintiff’s harm.357  As Justice 
Holder stated, the Third Restatement’s approach removes the “free-
floating” analysis in which courts consider whether a defendant could 
foresee harm to a plaintiff.358  Instead, in most circumstances, the 
foreseeability analysis shifts to the jury, who can better evaluate the specific 
facts of a case in the context of breach and proximate cause.  This shift also 
removes any overlap that the court and the jury may have on the issue of 
foreseeability, as occurred in Michigan.359 
The Third Restatement makes courts’ inquiries much simpler when they 
determine that a duty existed, which results in clearer legal precedent.  
Courts would not need to engage in multi-factored balancing tests to reach 
their conclusions.360  When courts incorporate factors like foreseeability, 
the nature of the relationship, or the ease with which a defendant could have 
provided warnings, they overstep the boundary between questions of law 
and questions of fact,361 and generate a murky legal analysis.362  The Third 
Restatement’s method, on the other hand, represents a clear analysis that 
instructs courts facing take-home asbestos cases to presume that a duty of 
reasonable care exists.363 
2.  Third Restatement’s Approach Results in More Transparent 
Policy Decisions 
The Third Restatement’s approach encourages courts that determine that 
no duty existed to clearly state their public policy considerations.  Although 
it states that courts generally should presume that a duty of reasonable care 
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exists, it qualifies that presumption by stating that, “[i]n exceptional cases, 
when an articulated countervailing principle or policy warrants denying or 
limiting liability in a particular class of cases, a court may decide that the 
defendant has no duty or that the ordinary duty of reasonable care requires 
modification.”364  This approach recognizes that courts often use 
ambiguous legal doctrines to hold that defendants do not owe a duty to 
take-home asbestos plaintiffs.365  Instead, the Third Restatement suggests 
that courts should state their true concerns unequivocally by holding that 
the possibility of adding to an already massive litigation militates in favor 
of finding that employers and premises owners generally owe no duty to 
third-party plaintiffs.366 
The Third Restatement does not prevent courts from finding no duty, but 
it does force them to consider their decisions more seriously, and will likely 
lead to fewer “no duty” holdings.  The Restatement suggests that courts 
should make “no duty” policy determinations only in “exceptional cases,” 
and it is not clear whether take-home asbestos cases fit this category, 
because employers and premises owners frequently know of the risks that 
asbestos poses to those who have regular contact with it.367  Courts would 
therefore have to articulate clear policy concerns for limiting these 
defendants’ liability. 
This approach may result in judges being reluctant to express policy 
concerns as explicitly as the Third Restatement suggests, because they do 
not want to step on the toes of legislators.368  New York, Georgia, and 
Michigan, however, have all expressed the important role that policy played 
in their decisions.369  The Michigan Supreme Court has even expressly 
stated that it considered policy the “ultimate inquiry” in its duty 
determination.370  Courts have thus already advanced policy concerns, and 
should not have to hide behind unclear legal doctrines to deny duty.  If, on 
the other hand, the court has weak policy concerns, then the case should go 
to a jury to determine liability. 
If a court does not want to make a policy-based determination about 
denying duty, it can still decide breach or proximate cause as a matter of 
law.371  A court can sometimes determine that a defendant unable to foresee 
harm to a plaintiff acted reasonably, so no breach occurred.372  Similarly, a 
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 370. See supra notes 300–01 and accompanying text. 
 371. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text. 
 372. See supra Part I.A.2. 
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court can deem the harm too remote, and hold that there was therefore no 
proximate causation.373 
This avenue, however, requires a court to observe the deferential “no 
reasonable jury” standard.374  Like the requirement that policy 
considerations should come into play only in “exceptional circumstances,” 
this requirement also forces courts to treat “no breach” and “no proximate 
cause” determinations seriously.  Exempting the defendants from liability in 
cases where the plaintiffs have suffered diseases like mesothelioma 
demands significant consideration.  The Third Restatement would therefore 
require courts to take a necessary pause before making “no duty” 
determinations.  They could still hold that employers and landowners do not 
face liability for injuries to third-party plaintiffs, but they would have to 
clearly delineate the policy reasons for denying duty, or satisfy the 
heightened “no reasonable jury” standard for denying breach or proximate 
cause. 
 CONCLUSION 
In courts’ efforts either to impose a duty or deny a duty in take-home 
asbestos cases, they have engaged in unclear analyses and set bad 
precedents for future cases.  Courts that find that a duty existed rely on fact-
specific inquiries like foreseeability that usurp the role of the jury, while 
courts that deny duty hide their policy determinations behind legal doctrines 
like nonfeasance and a lack of relationship between the parties.  The Third 
Restatement’s method sets a clearer standard.  It encourages courts to 
presume a default duty of reasonable care, which will send more take-home 
asbestos cases to juries who can better determine liability.  It also prompts 
courts to take “no liability” decisions more seriously.  Unless a court can 
articulate clear policy reasons for denying duty, or can meet the “no 
reasonable jury” standard when denying breach or proximate cause, it must 
adopt the default duty of reasonable care. 
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